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WHEN IS A CRIMINAL TRIAL NOT A CRIMINAL
TRIAL?-THE CASE AGAINST JURY TRIALS
IN JUVENILE COURT
In May 1968, a juvenile delinquency petition charged appellant
Joseph McKeiver, then 16 years of age, with robbery, larceny and re-
ceiving stolen goods.' At the time of the hearing McKeiver was repre-
sented by counse 2 and requested a trial by jury. The request was
denied, and upon the findings made by the Juvenile Court of Philadel-
phia that he had violated a law of the Commonwealth, McKeiver was
adjudicated a juvenile delinquent.3 On appeal the Superior Court
affirmed without opinion.4 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
granted leave to appeal, and affirmed the lower court holdings that
juveniles did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial in pro-
ceedings in which they were adjudicated delinquents upon findings
that they had violated a law of the Commonwealth.5 On appeal the
United States Supreme Court was faced with the narrow issue whether
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment assures the right
to trial by jury in the adjudicative phase of a state juvenile court
delinquency proceeding. By answering this question in the negative
the Court upheld the rulings of the lower courts and seemingly ended,
at least for the present, the recent trend toward further expansion of
juvenile rights."
I These offenses are felonies under Pennsylvania law. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4704,
4807, 4817 (1963).
2 At the hearing, McKiever's counsel stated that he had never seen McKeiver before
and was in the midst of his first interview with him (despite the fact that counsel's office
had been appointed five months earlier). Counsel was allowed five minutes for the inter-
view.
3 The evidence at the hearing seemed rather weak and contradictory. The Common-
wealth's evidence consisted mainly of the testimony of two of the three alleged victims
who were robbed by a group of twenty to thirty youths. After being robbed the boys were
taken to a park guard station by a passing motorist. After several minutes of preliminary
questioning the boys were placed in a patrol car which cruised the area for a few short
minutes when the victims spotted someone they thought was the boy who robbed them -
the boy was Joseph McKeiver.
One boy described the robbery as a gang effort while the other testified that the
thief acted alone. Both victims stated that the robber did not wear glasses, McKeiver has
worn glasses since childhood. One who also testified that the robber gave his bicycle away
also said that the robber rode a bicycle away from the robbery. The victims said that the
robber rode a bicycle throughout the event, yet one stated he identified McKeiver by his
characteristic walk.
4 In re McKeiver, 215 Pa. Super. 760, 255 A.2d 921 (1969).
SIn re McKeiver, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970).
6 403 U.S. 528 (1971). It is necessary to note that in this decision the Supreme Court
disposed of McKeiver as well as two other appeals. In re Terry 215 Pa. Super. 760, 255 A.2d
921 (1969) had been consolidated with McKeiver by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In re
Burrus 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879 (1969), was a case on writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court of North Carolina. For the purposes of this paper it will suffice that the reader be
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DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISSUE
The issue presented by McKeiver and its companion cases has
been very much in the public eye in recent years as one aspect of the
overall problem of youth crime and juvenile justice. So significant
were the facts concerning crime among this country's youngsters that
the President's Commission stated that "America's best hope for
reducing crime is to reduce juvenile delinquency and youth crime."17
Despite the fact that the problem is receiving such great attention from
the courts, it is by no means a new problem. The history of juvenile
justice is a history of paradoxes and dilemmas.8 Society has generally
been torn between treating youthful offenders either as wayward
children who must be rehabilitated or as criminals who must be
punished.
Early English criminal law established a rebuttable presumption
that any offender over the age of seven but under the age of fourteen
was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. Any offender
over fourteen was treated as an adult.9 This practice was carried to the
United States. The juvenile was entitled to the same constitutional
protections assured to his elders, but he was traumatized by the crimi-
nal hearing and subsequent incarceration with murderers, rapists and
thieves. Such a system of justice (if we can apply the word to such
proceedings) was far from rehabilitating.
In 1899 the first Juvenile Court Statute' 0 was adopted in Illinois:
aware that all three cases presented the identical issue; i.e., whether the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment assures the right to trial by jury in the adjudicative phase
of a state juvenile delinquency proceeding.
7 THE Pasamrr's ComrssioN ON LAW ENFORcEmENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JusrlcE: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIAM IN A FREE Socr 55 (1967) [hereinafter CRIME IN A
FREE Socrry]. It is difficult to draw a clear picture of the scope of juvenile delinquency
on a national level. The statistics drawn by Crime in a Free Society etch the rough
outline of the growing problem. The group of children ranging in age from 11 to 17 years
old while representing 13.2% of the population ate responsible for half the arrests for
serious property crimes such as burglary, larceny and motor vehicle theft. The arrest
rate for these crimes is higher for the 15 to 17-year-old group than it is for any other age
group in society.
It should also be observed that the trend is not indicative of a decrease. On the
contrary, in the five years between 1960 and 1965, arrests of persons under 18 years of age
was up 52% for such violent crimes as willful homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated
assault, larceny and burglary. The increment in arrests for the entire population over
18 was less than half that at 20%. For a further consideration of the paramount im-
portance of this problem see also Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional
Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. Or. Ry. 167 [hereinafter The Constitutional Con.
text].
8 See generally Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN.
L. R v. 1187 (1970).
9 W. CLARK 8- W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAw or CIMESs 125 (5th ed. 1952).
10 Act of April 21, 1899, I11. Laws 131.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
it was the incarnation of the philosophy of juvenile justice." Under
this system the goal was not punishment of the child but "what had
best be done in his interest and the interest of the state to save him
from a downward career."'12 The juvenile was to be treated at an in-
formal adjudication rather than in a criminal prosecution. 3 As a
result the rigid procedural requirements were discarded and the con-
cept of parens patriae was adopted. Such "civil" procedure' 4 was not
subject to the requirements which placed restrictions on the state when
it seeks to deprive a person of his freedom. 15
Although it is true that "for over sixty-five years the Supreme Court
gave no consideration at all to the constitutional problems involved
in the juvenile court area,"'16 problems did exist. The situation was
becoming so blatantly unjust that Dean Pound was prompted to say,
in 1937, that "the powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in com-
parison with those of our juvenile courts."'17 Slowly it was becoming
clear that unlimited discretion on the part of juvenile courts could
lead to the unjustifiable and arbitrary usurpation of due process of
law in the name of juvenile justice. Perhaps the earliest observation
of this was made for the Court by Mr. Justice Douglas in 1948, when
he stated that "neither man nor child can be allowed to stand con-
demned by methods which flout constitutional requirements of due
11 The juvenile court system seems quite commonplace in today's legal structure.
However at its inception one author called this system "a revolution in the attitude of
the state toward its offending children .... Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HAxv. L. Rv.
104 (1909).
12Id. at 119-120.
13 Judge Mack describes such informal hearings and their benefits:
The child who must be. brought into court should, of course, be made to know
that he is face to face with the power of the state, but he should at the same
time and more emphatically, be made to feel that he is the object of its care
and solicitude. The ordinary trappings of the courtroom are out of place in such
hearings. The judge on a bench looking down upon the boy standing at the bar
can never evoke a proper sympathetic spirit. Seated at a desk with the child
at his side where he can on occasion put his arm around his shoulder and draw
the lad to him, the judge while losing none of his judicial dignity, will gain
immensely the effectiveness of his work.
Id. at 120.
14 Judge Prettyman in Appendix A to his opinion in Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d
556,"561 (D.C. Cir. 1959) lists authorities from 51 jurisdictions showing that proceedings in
juvenile courts are not criminal cases.
15 The deprivation of these rights was not without its constitutional ramifications.
Nevertheless, its constitutionality has been sustained in most instances. See generally The
Constitutional Context; see also Waite, How Far Can Court Procedure be Socialized With-
out Impairing Individual Rights, 12 J. Carw. L.Q. & P . 339 (1922).
16 438 Pa. at 341, 265 A.2d at 352.
17 Foreward to YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY xxvii (1937).
For a more detailed discussion of the constitutional issues involved prior to the court's
enunciation of expanded juvenile rights, see generally Antieau, Constitutional Rights in
Juvenile Courts, 46 CoRNELL L.Q. 387 (1961).
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process of law."' 8 While at this early stage there was no explicit in-
clination toward treating juveniles with the same due process guaran-
tees enjoyed by their elders, nevertheless the idea of due process
requirements was present, albeit embryonic in form. Perhaps social
consciousness was not as acute; perhaps the failings of the juvenile
courts were not as blatant; perhaps those who led the movement felt
that the still young juvenile court needed time to prove itself. For
whatever reason, the Supreme Court convened and adjourned more
than ten times before a significant decision concerning deprivation
of basic due process at juvenile hearings was handed down. Even in
1962 the decision of the Court in Gallegos v. Colorado'9 was a weak
echo of what was stated in Haley. To be sure no new ground was
broken in Gallegos. However, the threshold proposition, that due
process of law may not be disregarded in a criminal prosecution de-
spite the fact that the defendant is a minor, was reaffirmed.
Tiim RECENT APPROACH
The first reaction of the Supreme Court to the complete discretion
enjoyed by the juvenile court, unfettered by due process requirements,
did not come until very recently. The reaction was registered in Kent
v. United States.20 While still not directly on the mark of rights of
juveniles in juvenile court, the Court did move perceptibly further
in Kent than it had previously gone. Kent stood for the proposition
that a juvenile court, before entering an order waiving its exclusive
jurisdiction and authorizing a minor to be prosecuted in a regular
criminal proceeding, must employ procedural regularity sufficient in
each case "to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fair-
ness.... [T]here is no place in our system of law for reaching a result
of such tremendous consequences without ceremony."' 21
Law does not develop in a vacuum. To the layman Kent might
18 Haley v. Ohio, 382 U.S. 596, 601 (1948). Haley did not specifically involve the issue
of a juvenile being adjudicated at a hearing but rather of a 15-year-old who was tried for
murder and convicted in a state criminal prosecution. The basic issue was whether a
confession obtained from the appellant was admissible. The Court said it was inadmissible
not because appellant was a juvenile but because anyone tried in a criminal prosecution
is entitled to basic due process.
199 70 US. 49 (1962). Gallegos was 14 years old. All other facts are similar to those
in Haley.
20 383 US. 541 (1966).
21 Id. at 553-554. The Court conceded the fact that the Juvenile Court had great dis-
cretion in determining whether it should retain jurisdiction over a child or should waive
such jurisdiction. Yet such discretion is not absolute and the Juvenile Court may not
consider the "critically important" question of whether a child shall be deprived of the
special protection of the Juvenile Court Act, D.C. CODE § 16-2308 (Supp. I1, 1964), without
a full investigation of the facts.
19711
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have appeared to be a relatively unimportant decision in the move-
ment toward the expansion of juvenile rights. However, seasoned
observers of the Court could discern the philosophical underpinnings
which supported the opinion in Kent.22 Indeed, Mr. Justice Fortas,
writing for the majority in Kent, went beyond the narrow issue of
waiver of jurisdiction and expressed the broader fear that
there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst
of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated
for children.23
And so it was that in 1966 the effect of Kent combined with the
previous dearth of decisions from the Court and the undeniable weight
of the evidence 4 attesting to the scope of the problem of juvenile
offenders on a national level. These forces could all be seen to accentu-
ate the broken dreams so handsomely embodied in the juvenile court
movement at the turn of the century and to expose the failure of the
Supreme Court to pass definitively on the question of constitutional
guarantees in juvenile hearings. In 1967 the Court handed down its
landmark decision in the area of juvenile justice-In re Gault.25
Seen from a jurisprudential angle, Gault was merely the logical
progression of the ideas expressed in Kent. While Kent stated that the
juvenile court judge's exercise of the power of the state as parens
patriae was not unlimited, Gault more candidly stated that "under
our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a
kangaroo court."' 26 Gault, then age 15, was charged with "Lewd Phone
Calls" in the referral report. He was taken into custody without notice
to his parents. His mother, after visiting the detention home where
Gerald was confined, was orally advised of the charge against her son and
that he would have a hearing the following afternoon. On the hearing
22 In his article, Professor Paulsen put the impact of Kent into perspective:
Though the Court's opinion in Kent does not actually hurl constitutional thunder-
bolts at the nations juvenile courts and police practices respecting juveniles, it
does raise a warning of turbulent weather ahead.
The Constitutional Context at 183.
28 383 U.S. at 556.
24 See note 7 supra.
258 87 U.S. 1 (1967). For a broader discussion of this significant decision see generally
Dorsen & Rezneck, Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAMILY L.Q. 1 (1967) [herein-
after Dorsen & Rezneck]; Ketcham, Guidelines from Gault: Revolutionary Requirements
and Reappraisal, 53 VA. L. REv. 1700 (1967); Lefstein, In re Gault, Juvenile Courts and
Lawyers, 53 A.BA.J. 811 (1967); Miller, The Dilemma of the Post Gault Juvenile Court,
3 FAMILY L.J. 229 (1969); Polier, The Gault Case: Its Practical Impact on the Philosophy
and Objectives of the Juvenile Court, 1 FAMILY L.Q. 47 (1967); Note, 14 How. L.J. 150
(1968); Note, 8 J. FAMILY L. 416 (1968).
26 887 Us. at 28.
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day a petition was filed making no reference to the reasons for the legal
action. The petition was not shown to the boy. At the hearing no one
was sworn and the complainant was not present. The arresting officer
attested that the boy's confession was made in the absence of his par-
ents, without an attorney and without being advised of his rights.
Following this hearing Gerald Gault was confined to the Arizona State
Industrial School for the period of his minority (6 years) unless sooner
discharged by due process of law.27 The facts in this case realized the
fears expressed by Justice Fortas in Kent.2 8 Juveniles such as Gault
were being deprived of their constitutional rights under the guise of
solicitous care. In re Gault held that while the essentials of due pro-
cess to which a juvenile is entitled are not commensurate with all the
rights and privileges to which an adult is entitled, nevertheless, certain
fundamental guarantees must be met. While not defining what such
guarantees are, the Court did assure to juveniles the following basic
rights: adequate notice of the charges, the rights to counsel, confronta-
tion and cross-examination and the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.29 Disdaining even the grant of these limited rights, Mr. Justice
Stewart strongly dissented from the majority. Espousing the philosophy
of the early juvenile justice reformers, he felt these rights were both
unnecessary burdens to the juvenile court system as well as a step back-
ward toward making juvenile proceedings resemble criminal trials, the
very situation which motivated the reformers to establish a juvenile
court almost one hundred years ago.30 The Court, however, left many
conspicuous questions unanswered, obviously intending to have them
answered on a case-by-case basis3 l In 1970 a New York case, In re
Winship,32 gave the Court an opportunity to further its expansion of
rights guaranteed to juveniles.
The Court held that a New York statute,3s which required any
determination at the conclusion of an adjudicatory hearing to be
based on a preponderance of the evidence rather than on the reason-
27 This offense, if committed by an adult is "punishable by a fine of not less than
five nor more than fifty dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than
two months." ARIz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 13-377 (1956).
28 383 US. at 556.
29 The Court expressly limited itself to the issues presented and indicated no opinion
as to whether the decision of that (Arizona Supreme) court with respect to such other issues
(viz. the right to a transcript of the proceedings and the right to appellate review) does or
does not conflict with the requirements of the Federal Constitution.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 11 (1966).
3od. at 78. (Stewart, J., dissenting). This concept did become the majority opinion
in McKeiver.
31 See generally Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note 25.
32 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
83 N.Y. FAmrLY CT. Acr § 744(b) (McKinney 1963).
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able-doubt standard, was unconstitutional.3 4 The opinion concluded
that the reasonable-doubt standard of proof was as much a matter of
due process as were the constitutional safeguards applied in Gault.
With this decision the reasonable-doubt standard became another
of the essentials of due process and fair treatment which Gault re-
quired be met. 5 With no concrete definition as to what constitutes
an essential element of due process, "court-watching" became an avoca-
tion of some attorneys who were awaiting decisions on such questions
as whether there is a right to appeal from an adjudication of delin-
quency, whether there is a right to have a transcript or other record
kept of the proceeding, whether the juvenile court judge must state
the grounds for his findings when he is the trier of fact, whether juve-
niles are entitled to invoke the constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures or whether juveniles are entitled
to trial by jury.3 6 Which of these rights are essential elements of due
process and therefore required by Gault? Which are non-essential legal
formalism and, therefore, at odds with the juvenile court philosophy?
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania resolved the issue as to trial by jury for
juveniles. It seems that the other issues will be resolved in due course.
THE INSTANT CASE
To be sure, the precise issue -whether juveniles are constitu-
tionally entitled to trial by jury in the adjudicative phase of a state
juvenile court delinquency proceeding -had been presented to lower
courts many times. The majority of these cases seem to have answered
the question in the negative.37 With the McKeiver appeal the issue was
84While the line between the "preponderance of the evidence" standard and the
"reasonable doubt" standard may seem to be indistinguishable, it is still noteworthy that
the New York Family Court Judge made the distinction quite clearly.
[H]e explicitly acknowledged that he was basing his findings of fact on the 'pre-
ponderance of the evidence' and frankly admitted that the proof fell short of
establishing guilt or delinquency beyond a reasonable doubt.
24 N.Y.2d 196, 206, 247 N.E.2d 253, 260, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414, 423 (1969) (Fuld, Ch. J., dissent-
ing).
35 The ideas enunciated in the dissenting opinion of Stewart in Gault were repeated,
in the dissent of the newly appointed Chief Justice, to the Winship majority. Inter alia,
Chief Justice Burger said
I dissent from further strait-jacketing of an already overly restricted system. What
the juvenile court system needs is not more but less of the trappings of legal
procedure and judicial formalism; the juvenile court system requires breathing
room and flexibility in order to survive, if it can survive the repeated assaults from
this Court.
397 U.S. at 376 (Burger, Ch. J., dissenting).
36 See generally Dorsen & Rezneck, supra note 25.
37 The cases which have held that there is no constitutional right to trial by jury for
juveniles are: In re Fucini, 44 Ill. 2d 305, 255 N.E.2d 380 (1970); In re D., 27 N.Y.2d 90,
261 N.E.2d 627, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1970); In re Johnson, 254 Md. 517, 255 A-2d 419 (1969);
[Vol. 46:126
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finally presented for resolution. Grounding the opinion on many
different bases, Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, con-
cluded that trial by jury is not constitutionally guaranteed to juve-
niles.
A proper understanding of the very nature of the right to trial
by jury is essential to a complete appreciation of the McKeiver deci-
sion.3 8 The right to jury trial is embodied in the United States Con-
stitution.8 9 The nature of this constitutional guarantee is a matter of
historical development through a long line of judicial decisions. Re-
cently, in the companion cases of Duncan v. Louisiana'0 and Bloom v.
Illinois,41 a "skeletal history" was traced which gave "impressive sup-
port for considering the right to jury trial in criminal cases to be
fundamental to our system of justice, an importance frequently recog-
nized in the opinions of this Court."42 Duncan was basically concerned
with a provision of the constitution of Louisiana which authorized a
trial by jury only in cases in which conviction may result in hard labor
or capital punishment.43 The Court stated, inter alia, that
[B]ecause we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is funda-
mental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Four-
teenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal
cases which - were they to be tried in a federal court - would
come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.44
Since Duncan would have been guaranteed a trial by jury if tried in
a federal court, the Supreme Court reversed the Louisiana court's
conviction. A cursory reading of the decision will indicate the thinking
Hopkins v. Youth Court, 227 So. 2d 282 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1969); In re Geiger, 184 Neb. 581,
169 N.W.2d 431 (1969); In re J.W., 106 N.J. Super. 129, 254 A.2d 334 (Juv. & Dom. Rd.
Ct. 1969); In re Alger, 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969); State v. Turner, 253 Ore.
235, 453 P.2d 910 (1969); Dryden v. Commonwealth, 435 S.W.2d 457 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968);
Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash. 2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 211
Pa. Super. 62, 234 A.2d 9 (1967). Contra, Nieves v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968); Saunders v. Lupiano, 30 App.
Div. 2d 803, 292 N.Y.S.2d 44 (Ist Dep't 1968).
38 For an in depth discussion of the area of jury trials, see generally Comment,
Jury Trials in Criminal Prosecution: "Freedom Lives", 45 ST. Jon's L. Rnv. 304 (1970).
89 US. CoNsr. amend. VI states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed."
40 391 US. 145 (1968).
41391 US. 194 (1968).
42 391 US. at 153-154. Duncan cited numerous decisions supporting the importance of
the right to trial by jury.
43 Appellant Duncan was tried on a charge of simple battery which is a misdemeanor
and is punishable by a fine of not more than $300 or imprisonment for not more than
two years, or both. Appellant was convicted and sentenced to serve 60 days in prison and to
pay a fine of $150.
44 391 US. at 149.
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of the Court as to the overriding importance of trial by jury. Quoting
from various decisions, the Court illustrated that the right to trial by
jury was among those "fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions," 45 and
is "basic in our system of jurisprudence"46 and "is a fundamental right,
essential to a fair trial," 47 any crime which might result in a two-year
incarceration was therefore a "serious crime.
48
In the case of Bloom v. Illinois the question of trial by jury in
criminal contempt proceedings was at issue. The court again asserted
the basic role played by the jury trial in criminal prosecutions. Indeed,
the Court suggested that a stronger argument for the necessity of jury
trial can be made where a defendant should be protected "against the
arbitrary exercise of official power. Contemptuous conduct, though a
public wrong, often strikes at the most vulnerable and human qualities
of judge's temperament." 49 The paramount importance of the jury
trial is therefore clearly expressed in both Duncan and Bloom.50
In light of the preeminence given to the jury trial as a constitu-
tional bulwark against faulty fact-finding, it becomes clear that the
first obstacle which the Court had to overcome was its own recent
decisions. However, labelling the juvenile proceeding a civil prosecu-
tion51 obviated the need to attack the position of importance held by
the right to trial by jury in criminal prosecutions. Since the juvenile
proceeding has not been held to be a "criminal prosecution," there is
no automatic application of the Duncan rule to such cases. The Court
wisely observed, however, that the mere label of "civil" does not re-
move criminal aspects from such proceeding. The question cannot be
solved simply by attaching the label of "civil" or "criminal" to a juve-
nile proceeding. Rather, the threshold question to be answered was
asked in Gault and concerns ascertaining the precise impact of the
45 391 U.S. at 148, quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932).
46 1d., quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
47 Id., quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963).
48 Duncan stated that where a conviction could result in imprisonment of two years
the fourth amendment guarantee is called into action. Only two years later, in Baldwin
v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), the period of imprisonment needed to require trial by
jury was reduced to six months.
49 Id. at 202.
50 Due to the fact that DeStephano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), had limited
Duncan and Bloom to prospective application, an earlier appeal, DeBacker v. Brainard,
396 U.S. 28 (1969), which had presented the juvenile jury trial issue directly to the Court,
was dismissed. In a per curiam decision, the opinion stated that as to DeBacker, whose
juvenile court hearing took place prior to May 20, 1968, the date of the Duncan and
Bloom rulings, Duncan and Bloom were inapplicable.
51 Cf. note 14 supra.
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due process requirement upon such proceeding.5 2 "Fundamental fair-
ness" -not the application of all protections guaranteed to criminal
defendants -was the mandate of Gault and Winship. What then is
the precise impact of jury trial upon a juvenile proceeding? McKeiver
held that one cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary
component of fact-finding.5
Dispensing in this manner with the inherent necessity of trial by
jury for a fair determination of facts, McKeiver then considered the
impact of jury trial upon the juvenile court system. Here the Court
discussed the procedural practicalities rather than the substantive
realities. Mr. Justice Blackmun discussed at length the philosophy
underlying the juvenile court. He acknowledged its shortcomings and
problems but rejected the pessimism which threatens the very exis-
tence of the system of juvenile justice. He expressed the fear that the
introduction of juries will
[R]emake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process
and will put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect
of an intimate, informal protective proceeding. 54
The Court also emphasized the conspicuous absence of any recom-
mendation of the introduction of jury trial into juvenile proceedings
by the report submitted by the President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and the Administration of Justice. 55 While the report had been
openly critical of the dismal failures of the American system of juve-
nile justice, 56 it nevertheless stated that "the ideal of separate treatment
52 387 U.S. at 14. The Court in McKeiver noted that while the privilege against self-
incrimination had been imposed upon state criminal trials in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964), there was no automatic application of such privilege to juvenile trials through
Gault. Rather, Gault considered the impact of this privilege upon the juvenile hearing
before requiring it. The same was true of the rights of cross-examination and confron-
tation, guaranteed to state prosecutions by Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) and Doug-
las v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). Again Gault considered the precise impact of such
due process requirements upon juvenile hearings.
53403 U.S. at 543. The Court conceded that "there is much to be said for it, to be sure,
but we have been content to pursue other ways for determining facts." Id. The Court
cited Duncan in reasoning that not every criminal trial held before a judge alone is unfair.
The Court also questioned the utter necessity of a jury for fact-finding integrity in view
of DeStephano's limiting Duncan to prospective application, a limitation which the
Court felt would never have been made were the integrity of the result at issue. The
author feels that the majority in McKeiver chose to underrate the fundamental position
given to jury trial by Duncan, 403 U.S. at 545.
54 The dilemma is again obvious-give the child all the constitutional safeguards
of an adversary proceeding or attempt to treat him informally and suffer the loss of
basic rights as has been the experience of the past.
55TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRimE (1967) [hereinafter
TAsK FORCE REPORT].
56 For an excellent expression of the chasm between theory and practice in the
juvenile justice system see TAsK FORCE REnRa 9.
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of children is still worth pursuing." 57 In addition, the Court reasoned
that the benefits derived from a jury trial would be negligible when
compared with the "traditional delay, the formality and the clamor
of the adversary system and, possibly, the public trial"5 8" which would
be the by-products of jury trials.59 As a further authority, the Court
notes that at least 29 states and the District of Columbia deny juve-
niles the right to trial by jury by statute,60 while other states have
denied this right by judicial decision. 61
While the Court expresses great hope in the self-healing powers
of the juvenile court, it is not naive. It realizes that there may be but
a short time before hopes are dashed again. "Perhaps that ultimate
disillusionment will come one day, but for the moment we are dis-
inclined to give impetus to it."62 The dissenters feel the disillusion-
ment has arrived already.
In an extremely cogent and realistic dissent Justices Black,
Douglas63 and Marshall cut their way through the rhetorical smoke
screen and saw the situation as it exists in all too many states. 4 In
57 Id.
58 403 U.S. at 550.
59 The Court obviously conceded that were any state to feel that a jury trial is
desirable or even essential nothing would preclude it from injecting such a procedure
into its juvenile courts.
60 ALA. CODE tit. 13, § 869 (1958); ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.070 (Supp. 1970); ARiZ. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 8-229 (1956) (repealed Laws 1970), ch. 223, § 1); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-206
(1947); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1175 (Supp. 1969-70); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(2) (1961);
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-2420 (1970); HAwAIr REv. LAws § 571-41 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 16-1813 (Supp. 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-3215 (Supp. 1957); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.27
(1969); Ky. REv. STAT. § 208.060 (1962); LA. REV. STAT. § 13:1579 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260.155 (1) (1971); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7185-08 (1942); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.171 (6)
(1962) (equity practice controls); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-206.03 (2) (1968); NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 62.190 (3) (1967); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:4-35 (1952); N.Y. FAMILY COURT Acr §§ 164, 165
(McKinney 1963) and N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 4101 (McKinney 1963); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-285
(1969); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-16-18 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2151.35 (Page 1968);
ORE. REv. STAT. § 419A98 (1) (1968); PA. STAT. tit. 11, § 247 (1965); CODE OF LAw S.C.
§ 15,1095.19 (Supp. 1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-10-94 (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33
§ 651 (a) (Supp. 1970); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.030; D.C. CODE ANN. 16-2316 (a)
(Supp. 1971).
61 In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924); Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121
At. 678 (1923); In re Fletcher, 251 Md. 520, 248 A.2d 564 (1968); Commonwealth v. Page,
339 Mass. 313, 316, 159 N.E.2d 82, 85 (1959); In re Perham, 104 N.H. 276, 184 A.2d 449
(1962). While not conclusive, the Court felt the fact that when a practice is followed
by such a number of states, it is worth considering "in determining whether the practice
'offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental.'" 403 U.S. at 548, quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
62 403 U.S. at 551.
63 When the issue of jury trials for juveniles was first presented to the Court in
DeBacker, both Justices Black and Douglas refused to dismiss the appeal but considered
the appeal on the merits and filed separate dissenting opinions. These dissents were,
in a very real sense, an obituary for the juvenile justice system.
64 The facts concerning the staffs of juvenile courts are nothing short of startling.
JUVENILE TRIALS
McKeiver, Terry and Burrus the issue had been whether they had
violated a state criminal law. "Adjudiciation" as a delinquent could
mean "confinement" in a state correctional institution 65 for up to 10
years in one appeal and for not less than five years in the other two.
Under such circumstances no adult could be denied trial by jury.0 6
Indeed, the dissenters feel that no procedural protection should be
denied juveniles.
Where a state uses its juvenile
[C]ourt proceedings to prosecute a juvenile for a criminal act and
to order "confinement" until the child reaches 21 years of age or
where the child at the threshold of the proceedings faces that
prospect, then he is entitled to the same procedural protection as an
adult.67
Justice Black repeated many of the arguments he presented in De-
Backer."" The idea was again expressed that the label "civil proceeding"
was a mere sham when one considers the possible length of the incar-
ceration, the condition of many correctional institutions and the lack
of secrecy of many of the proceedings. As a support to these arguments
the dissenters appended a recent decision from Rhode Island to their
dissent.69 This decision was extremely practical in its approach and
avoided the many generalities in which the majority in McKeiver in-
The number of juvenile judges as of 1964 was listed as 2,987, of whom 213 are full-time
juvenile court judges. See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUvENILE COURT JUDGEs, DrREcToRY AND
MANUAL (1964). Of these it is reported that
half have no undergraduate degree at all; a fifth had received no college educa-
tion at all; a fifth were not members of the bar. Almost three-quarters devote
less than a quarter of their time to juvenile and family matters and judicial
hearings turn out to be little more than attenuated interviews of 10 to 15 minutes
duration. Similarly, more than four-fifths of the juvenile judges polled in a recent
survey reported no psychologist or psychiatrist available to them on a regular
basis- over half a century after the juvenile court movement set out to achieve
the coordinated application of the behavioral and social sciences to the misbe-
having child.
CR-ME IN A FRaE SOCirE, 80.
65 Behind the non-offensive words "state correctional institution" may exist factors
which led one Pennsylvania court to refer to one such institution as "a maximum security
prison for adjudged delinquents." In re Bethea, 215 Pa. Super. 75, 76, 257 A.2d 268, 269
(1969). The institution being referred to is a brick building with barred windows, locked
steel doors, a cyclone fence topped with barbed wire and guard towers.
66 Duncan held that a defendant who is tried for a crime which can bring a maximum
incarceration of 2 years is entitled to a trial by jury as a matter of right. The Court has
since reduced the period of incarceration necessary for a mandatory jury trial to 6 months
in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
67 403 U.S. at 559 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
68 "I can see no basis whatsoever in the language of the Constitution for allowing
persons like appellant the benefit of those rights [granted in Gault] and yet denying
them a jury trial, a right which is surely one of the fundamental aspects of
criminal justice in the English-speaking world."
Id., quoting DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. at 34 (dissenting opinion).
69 In the matter of McCloud, - R.I. - (Family Ct. Jan. 15, 1971).
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dulged. The appendix stressed the trauma which a juvenile hearing
causes a minor and asks whether a trial by twelve objective citizens can
cause more trauma than is caused by being incarcerated by a judge who
sits as a one-man grand jury and then sits in judgment on his own deter-
mination arising out of the proceedings and facts he conducted.
As to the fear that the introduction of jury trials would impair
the functioning of the juvenile justice system, this simply is not sup-
ported by fact.7 0 Far from impairing the justice in the juvenile court
it is argued that
[B]y granting the juvenile the right to a jury trial, we would, in
fact, be protecting the accused from the judge who is under
pressure to move the cases, the judge with too many cases and not
enough time.71
In addition, the recent decision of Williams v. Florida,72 which held
that the constitutional right to trial by jury may be satisfied by a jury
of less than twelve men, could facilitate the introduction of juries into
juvenile court. A smaller jury could help maintain the informality so
essential to juvenile hearings while providing objective fact-finders.
It is further argued that a jury cannot render the juvenile hearing more
public than is presently the situation with "[w]itnesses for the prosecu-
tion and defense, social workers, court reporters, students, police
trainees, probation counsellors and sheriffs present in the courtroom." 73
Finally, the Appendix goes to the heart of the matter with its
consideration of the label "civil" and "criminal." The inescapable
conclusion is reached - "Murder is murder; robbery is robbery -
they are both criminal offenses, not civil, regardless and independent
of the age of the doer... . -74 The fact that the juvenile court was meant
to rehabilitate children who had become delinquent does not mean
that the juvenile court has abdicated from the judicial system. Indeed,
it is difficult to understand why solicitous, rehabilitative treatment
necessarily precludes the sixth amendment guarantee of trial by jury.
One can only wonder why treatment as a child and this constitutional
protection are mutually exclusive.
70 The Denver Juvenile Court and the Detroit Juvenile Court are cited as two
examples of courts where jury trials have been permitted by statute. In Denver the first
seven months of 1970 saw fewer than two dozen requests for jury trials and Detroit Juvenile
Court had less than five jury trials in the year 1969-1970.
71 403 U.S. at 565 (Appendix to dissent).
72 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
73403 U.S. at 567 (Appendix to dissent).
741d. at 571-572 (Appendix to dissent).
